Ahead of the Ankara Summit, Trump Presses the Button for 80 Jet Engines to Türkiye

By Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın

“Türkiye is a NATO member. Some people don’t see Türkiye that way, but it actually is. It’s a strong member of NATO. Yes, I’ll probably do something that will make him (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) very happy.”

Despite objections from some members of Congress, the Trump administration has officially notified the legislative body about the sale of dozens of fighter jet engines to Türkiye, valued at over $700 million [1].

The administration’s decision to move forward with the sale of General Electric F110 turbofan engines—worth more than $700 million—for Türkiye’s indigenous KAAN fighter jet program is quickly shaping up to be one of the most strategically significant NATO aviation developments of 2026. It also points to a calculated geopolitical recalibration between Washington and Ankara. The proposed package, which includes dozens of GE F110‑GE‑129 or F110‑GE‑129E engines, will directly support the early serial production phase of the fifth‑generation KAAN fighter, developed by Turkish Aerospace Industries (TUSAŞ). The timing of the move underscores that the White House no longer sees Türkiye as a sanctions problem to be isolated, but rather as a strategically indispensable NATO power that requires a measured re‑engagement—especially amid intensifying rivalry in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indo‑Pacific [2].

The step comes ahead of a critical NATO summit set to take place in Ankara next month and serves as a notable gesture toward President Tayyip Erdoğan, whom Trump views as a key ally [3].

Ankara–Washington Rapprochement Ahead of the NATO Summit

Right before this move that sent ripples through the defense industry, US President Donald Trump fielded questions from the press in the Oval Office. When reporters pressed him on the jet engine supply to Türkiye and military aircraft programs, Trump signaled that he would take a positive approach in talks with Ankara. Emphasizing that Türkiye holds a particularly vital position in the defense sector, Trump said: “Türkiye has a massive defense industrial base. It has 3,000 companies operating across the NATO alliance, including the US. It is so strong that people don’t realize just how big Türkiye is militarily. Thanks to Erdoğan, Türkiye has a very powerful military.” [4]

Stressing that he was going to the NATO Summit for Erdoğan, the US President stated, “Erdoğan said come, so I’m going.” Trump also underscored Erdoğan’s decision to remain neutral during recent regional conflicts, pointing out that the Turkish leader was one of the strongest candidates to enter a potential war with Iran. According to Trump, Erdoğan stayed out of the conflict at Trump’s direct request. The US President added that Erdoğan’s stance was partly shaped by his critical position toward Israel. NATO Secretary‑General Mark Rutte, for his part, emphasized Türkiye’s strategic importance during the talks. [5]

The Trump administration has formally notified Congress of its intent to sell dozens of jet engines to Türkiye, worth more than $700 million. This marks a critical step in the defense industry cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Türkiye. The notification which sets the official approval mechanisms in motion signals a new phase in military ties between the two countries. The procurement targets engines from General Electric for Türkiye’s homegrown fighter jet, KAAN. Built to power KAAN, which sits at the heart of Ankara’s drive to minimize foreign dependence, the engines will form the operational backbone of the country’s first indigenous combat aircraft a project first launched in 2016. With a budget exceeding roughly $700 million, the deal is set to give the jet its operational teeth. [6]

Türkiye’s 2019 purchase of Russian air defense systems strained relations with the United States and eroded congressional support for Ankara. In response, Washington imposed sanctions and removed Türkiye from the F-35 fighter program. Congress also passed legislation barring F-35 sales to Türkiye as long as Ankara retains the S-400s, citing security risks that the Russian systems pose to US-made aircraft. Although ties have since warmed under Trump, the issue has remained a significant point of friction between the two countries. [7] Teams around both Trump and Erdoğan are now pushing for a swift resolution, ideally before the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, where the two leaders are expected to meet. [8]

The S-400 Factor and the Background to Overcoming the Kaan and F-35 Crisis

Türkiye had already built its fifth-generation fighter, KAAN, domestically. Yet the aircraft—widely seen as heralding Türkiye’s rise as a major defense power—was, for the time being, grounded, largely because of export licenses stuck in the US congressional bureaucracy. Hakan Fidan, head of Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization, had put it bluntly: “KAAN’s engines are waiting in Congress. Production can’t start until those licenses clear.” His words were a warning. By early 2026, the geopolitical landscape had shifted, making congressional hesitation look increasingly costly. The NATO summit was set to be held in Türkiye.

Russia’s pressure on NATO’s eastern flank had not eased. The question of which way wavering members would lean was no longer theoretical. Over the previous decade, Washington had watched, one after another, as its allies quietly began taking precautions. Each case had its own explanation. Yet the broader picture was harder to account for. That brings us to how things actually work in Washington—because the phrase “congressional objections” conjures a more dramatic image than reality warrants. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the executive branch notifies Congress before major foreign military sales. The Trump administration has already done that. The 15‑day review period has begun. Congress can object. Individual members can protest, hold press conferences, and write letters. In June 2026, the formal notification for more than 80 GE F110 engines approved for Türkiye was sent to Capitol Hill.

Russia’s pressure on NATO’s eastern flank had not eased. The question of which way wavering members would lean was no longer theoretical. Over the previous decade, Washington had watched, one after another, as its allies quietly began taking precautions. Each case had its own explanation. Yet the broader picture was harder to account for. That brings us to how things actually work in Washington—because the phrase “congressional objections” conjures a more dramatic image than reality warrants. Under the Arms Export Control Act, the executive branch notifies Congress before major foreign military sales. The Trump administration has already done that. The 15‑day review period has begun. Congress can object. Individual members can protest, hold press conferences, and write letters. In June 2026, the formal notification for more than 80 GE F110 engines approved for Türkiye was sent to Capitol Hill.

The announcement came days before the NATO summit and was presented to the public as a show of alliance solidarity. Privately, however, it was a calculation: the cost of continued hesitation—in influence ceded to Beijing and an ally left to fend for itself—now outweighed domestic political discomfort. Yet this does not open the door that Türkiye most wants opened. The F‑35 remains out of reach, and the path back runs through the Russian air‑defense system S‑400 on Turkish soil—the very system that triggered the original removal. Ankara’s argument that it bought the system, that the matter should be considered closed, and that gestures of goodwill like the engine deal demonstrate its alignment with NATO, does not align with Washington’s view that the S‑400’s presence near NATO assets poses an ongoing intelligence risk that no amount of diplomatic warmth can fully resolve.

The Trump administration has shown itself more open to creative solutions here than its predecessors. Quiet talks are currently taking place at levels that remained silent under previous administrations. Trump himself has made it clear that he wants the relationship to work, that he sees Türkiye differently than foreign‑policy circles do, and that he is prepared to consider arrangements others have ruled out. Whether this willingness translates into an actual resolution—a storage deal, a decommissioning agreement, or some technical framework that allows both sides to claim victory—remains genuinely uncertain. According to many sources close to the matter, the biggest obstacle to a storage arrangement that could be set up through a passive ally under joint supervision is Russia. At this stage, Türkiye does not want—at least not yet—such a source of tension with Russia on its agenda. [9]

Overcoming Congressional and Legal Barriers to F‑35 Sales

Meanwhile, US Vice President JD Vance stated that the Trump administration is comprehensively evaluating potential steps toward Türkiye’s reinstatement in the F‑35 fighter jet program. Vance noted that the process is being conducted within the framework of US law and relevant security criteria, while emphasizing that the final decision mechanism requires a multi‑layered review. Recent reports indicate that Ankara still possesses the Russian system that blocks its F‑35 purchases, even as the White House moves forward with the $700 million jet engine sale to Türkiye. [10]

Vance’s remarks, taken together with Trump’s recent positive signals on defense cooperation with Türkiye, have revived the possibility that a new chapter could open in Washington’s ties with Ankara. The French press, in its assessment of developments, suggested: “The meeting between Erdoğan and Trump at the NATO Summit is highly critical. Türkiye is expected to see its path cleared for the F‑35. The date is set—they will return to the program within July.” At the same time, it was noted that while Trump’s political support could accelerate the process, congressional approval and various technical security certifications remain mandatory. Therefore, a potential return scenario is not expected in the short term but rather could take shape over a phased timeline. Diplomatic sources, for their part, stress that the possibility of Türkiye’s return to the F‑35 program is a critical issue not only militarily but also for intra‑NATO balances and US regional strategy. [11]

US law does not permit Türkiye to operate or possess the S‑400 system if it wishes to rejoin the F‑35 program. However, US Ambassador to Türkiye Tom Barrack said in December that the warm relationship between Trump and Erdoğan had helped the two sides hold “some of the most productive talks we’ve had on this subject in nearly a decade.”

KAAN is regarded as one of the most important projects launched in 2016 under Türkiye’s goal of reducing foreign dependence in its defense industry. With this aircraft, Türkiye aims to meet part of its air force’s fighter jet needs through domestic means in the long run. Yet the engine issue remains a critical challenge for the KAAN project. Although Türkiye ultimately aims to develop indigenous engines, the early production and testing phases require US‑made General Electric engines. [12]

The Trump administration first announced on June 24 its intention to move forward with the sale, despite objections from some members of Congress over the S‑400 Russian defense systems that Türkiye purchased in 2019. In its notification to Congress, the State Department stated: “The US government, having taken into account political, military, economic, human rights, and arms control considerations, is prepared to authorize the export of these items.” Congress has a 15‑day window to introduce a joint resolution if it wishes to block the sale.
Türkiye’s 2019 acquisition of Russian air‑defense systems disrupted congressional support for Türkiye as a US ally, though lawmakers ultimately approved F‑16 fighter sales in 2024. Some of those concerns persist. According to two sources, including a US official, Representative Gregory Meeks of New York—the ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee—has voiced objections during an informal review process and has not given his approval to the package. [13]

Any such resolution would need to pass both chambers. Representative Chris Pappas of New Hampshire wrote in a social media post: “We cannot reward Erdoğan’s government while it continues to violate US law and threaten our reliable democratic allies,” adding, “Absolutely no F‑35s for Türkiye.” [14]

If Congress wants to block the sale, it must introduce a joint resolution of disapproval within 15 days. Such a resolution would need to pass both chambers and would be subject to a presidential veto by Trump. [15]

According to sources, despite the objections, a final decision to proceed with the sale is expected to be finalized in the coming days, followed by a formal notification from the State Department to Congress. The congressional review process is designed to allow lawmakers to weigh in on major sales, but objections are not binding if an administration wants to go through with a deal. The Trump administration has either brushed aside or threatened to ignore congressional restrictions on various arms sales. A State Department official said, “As a matter of policy, we do not comment on ongoing arms transfers. Official correspondence with Congress is conducted through formal channels.” [16]

Conclusion and Possible Developments

As the core takeaway of this brief analysis, it must be stated that President Trump’s historic statement from the Oval Office, delivered at a critical juncture, represents the transition from a pledge to action—a strong show of support for Ankara ahead of the NATO summit scheduled for July 5–7, with strategically premeditated consequences.

Trump’s statement is a significant opportunity to build a “Stronger NATO” and to address the Atlantic Alliance at the Ankara NATO Summit, while repairing the long-standing trust deficit in US‑Türkiye relations. It signals a paradigm shift aligned with the vital interests of both parties, aimed at strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces—NATO’s second‑largest military—against the strategic challenges of the next two decades. Moreover, as NATO Secretary‑General Rutte has noted, the Turkish defense industry possesses robust and agile potential, skilled manpower, experience, and market share for the modernization and co‑production of European and NATO armies. Concrete examples on the table include Spain’s Hürjet, Italy’s TB‑3 sales, ballistic missile production for the Czech Republic, and warship sales to Romania and Portugal.

As NATO moves toward vital decisions on rapid decision‑making, quick military reaction, deployment of new tactical nuclear weapons, and new headquarters and base structures, the swift delivery of F‑35s to the Turkish Air Force for the modernization of nuclear weapons at Incirlik Air Base will strengthen NATO’s air defense.

Another crucial point is that, amid increasing international competitive pressure from China, Russia, and emerging aviation players such as Japan, Germany, France, Sweden, and Brazil, the sale of aircraft engines to the Turkish market represents an extraordinary opportunity for the US aviation industry. On the other hand, the HÜRJET fighter engines—co‑developed with Spain—along with F‑16 Block‑70 procurements and spare parts sales, as well as renewed participation in F‑35 joint production, are in the vital interests of both allies and could serve as concrete examples of new “win‑win” windows.

Türkiye currently possesses 10 GE‑F110 engines for the KAAN fighter prototypes, which are expected to fly in August. The additional 80 engines represent a major development that will accelerate the delivery of 20 aircraft to the Turkish Air Force starting in 2020. In our view, the critical threshold has been crossed.

It should be noted that the rapidly shifting international geopolitical and geo‑economic landscape—including fractures in the US’s inevitable competition with China, the risk of spillover from the ongoing wars in Ukraine, Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, critical raw material supply chains, the threat to global maritime trade from a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz, efforts to prevent Iran’s nuclear weapons, and the establishment of ceasefires and sustainable peace in the Black Sea‑Mediterranean‑Gulf region—has led the US political and military elite to take into account the effective diplomatic and military power of NATO member Türkiye.
Türkiye was unlawfully removed from the F‑35 program in 2019 after acquiring Russian‑made S‑400 air defense systems. Many Democratic lawmakers have opposed the engine sale and continue to warn against any F‑35 sales to Türkiye. However, regarding the main agenda item—the sale of 80 F100 GE jet engines—I believe Congress will not create a blockage within the 15‑day period to submit a joint resolution of disapproval.

Ahead of the Ankara NATO Summit, where a “Stronger NATO” and the Atlantic Alliance will be put on the table, it is assumed that Türkiye’s role in NATO and regional security will increase, and that historic decisions will be taken—not toward war with Russia, but toward an acceptable ceasefire and preventing Europe from being dragged into a potential nuclear conflict.