THE END OF THE PROLONGED RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR OF ATTRITION: AN HONOURABLE PEACE OR CONTINUING THE WAR?
Prof. Dr. Mesut Hakkı Caşın
“Russia is ready for peace talks with Ukraine on the basis of the agreements reached in Istanbul,” he said. “On the basis of the agreements reached in Istanbul, the methods discussed in Anchorage, and, most importantly, the realities on the ground.”
Russian President Vladimir Putin
“Russia must be brought under a level of pressure that leaves it with no alternative but peace. We will work very hard to achieve this before winter, in the autumn. However, we clearly understand whom we are dealing with and that Putin hopes to continue prolonging this war.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky
When asked about Russia’s attacks on civilian targets, U.S. President Donald Trump responded:
“We’re not involved. There’s an ocean between us.
ABSTRACT
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has resulted in the deaths of more than one million people and the occupation of approximately 20% of Ukrainian territory by Russia. Ukraine has responded with long-range drone strikes that have reportedly disabled up to 40% of Russia’s refinery capacity, while Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities. U.S.-mediated talks between Russia and Ukraine have not yet resulted in a ceasefire, and the two sides remain divided over territorial concessions by Ukraine and security guarantees. With no concrete signal emerging from the meeting between Lavrov and Rubio regarding an end to the war in Ukraine, both sides have continued to intensify the scale of their attacks on the battlefield. In this new phase of the war, Ukraine is striking targets deep inside Russia, while Moscow continues to target Kyiv with ballistic missiles around the clock. Ukraine argues that Russian oil and gas facilities constitute legitimate targets because Moscow remains heavily dependent on hydrocarbon exports to finance its war effort.
As noted above, as the war enters its fifth year, both sides have intensified their long-range attacks; there is no indication that the fighting will cease, while gains on the battlefield are being achieved only at the cost of heavy human casualties. Under its new military strategy, Ukraine is using long-range missiles and UAVs to strike not only civilian and logistical targets inside Russia but also military installations. A factory in Kirov producing missile components used by the Russian military was reportedly targeted by a “Flamingo”-type cruise missile, despite being approximately 1,300 kilometres from the Ukrainian border.
Ukrainian unmanned aerial and naval vehicles operating in the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea have also reportedly effectively blockaded the strategically important port of Novorossiysk. The Russian Ministry of Defence reportedly suspended the movement of vessels from the port during nighttime hours. Daily reports released by the Ukrainian Air Force indicate that Russia launched 376 missiles against Ukraine during the month, more than twice the number launched in June. Most of the attacks during the month targeted the capital, Kyiv. It appears that Ukraine’s objective of carrying the war into Russian territory is beginning to have an effect.
Indeed, in recent days Ukraine has intensified attacks on strategically important logistical locations, including Wildberries, Russia’s largest e-commerce platform. Russia, meanwhile, continues to target Ukrainian cities. According to Ukraine’s State Emergency Service, overnight attacks were carried out against the Sumy, Odesa and Mykolaiv regions. Russia also launched ballistic missile and UAV attacks against seven locations in and around Kyiv. Following the attacks, fires broke out at several warehouses and facilities.
The Kyiv Military Administration stated that at least 14 people had been killed and 27 injured in the attacks. The Russian Ministry of Defence said the strikes targeted logistics hubs and supply centres in and around Kyiv. The ministry claimed that these facilities were being used for military purposes, stating:
“These centres were involved in the storage and delivery of various weapons and military equipment, as well as in the production and distribution of unmanned aerial vehicles.”
The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that two civilian vessels owned by Turkish interests, Yaşar and Nadezhda, came under attack in the Black Sea on the evening of 3 August.
What, then, is the actual situation on the battlefield? Is significant pressure building on Vladimir Putin that could compel him to seek a diplomatic way out? Will the recent political turmoil in Kyiv affect Ukraine’s ability to sustain an open-ended war of attrition? And, in particular, how will the roles of external actors such as Europe, NATO and the United States evolve?
The resignation of the German Chancellor, following that of the British Prime Minister, is adversely affecting Europe’s economic, political and military balance of power. Will the United States compensate for the damage suffered by Kyiv as a result of the latest attacks?
A U.S. official stated that the most suitable option for supplying Patriot surface-to-air missiles to Ukraine would be for some components to be produced in Ukraine and assembled in Germany, where an older Patriot model is already manufactured and where the more advanced PAC-3 model is also expected to be produced. Trump has expressed security concerns over the delivery of the entire stock of highly classified Patriot systems to Ukraine.
ATTACKS ON CIVILIAN TANKERS IN THE BLACK SEA ARE INTENSIFYING
For Türkiye, the most significant negative development is that, despite Ankara’s efforts to pressure both capitals toward peace, armed attacks on Turkish-owned tankers in the Black Sea are adversely affecting maritime navigational safety. The question is whether Ankara, under the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits, can invoke legal and military measures beyond diplomatic and political rhetoric. This brief academic article aims to examine the military, political, legal and diplomatic developments that directly concern Türkiye and regional security, and to analyse possible roadmaps in the event of either a ceasefire or a prolonged conflict.
INTRODUCTION
The invasion launched by Moscow four years ago is forcing Europe to rearm and to rethink the nature of future warfare on the continent, conventional and nuclear armament, and the evolving profiles of new strategic alliance models beyond the United States. At the same time, Eurasian states have come together in unprecedented economic, technological and strategic ways. Iran has transferred weapons and North Korea has deployed troops deep into the European theatre of war.
As Europe cuts its ties with Russia, its energy economy is undergoing a transformation, while the dangers of excessive dependence on a hostile power have become increasingly apparent. Many of these developments have accelerated since U.S. President Donald Trump took office. His hostile attitude toward Europe, his suspension of aid to Ukraine, and his desire to reach an agreement with Russia place an even greater responsibility on Europe to ensure stability along its borders and prepare for future conflicts. As Washington refocuses on the Western Hemisphere, Europe is turning toward new partners around the world and accelerating the transition toward a post-American world.
DAMAGE TO RUSSIAN OIL REFINERIES FOLLOWING UKRAINIAN MISSILE ATTACKS
The Russia–Ukraine war appears likely to remain in a strategic stalemate through 2026, as tactical gains and external support continue to balance each other out and neutralise one another rather than producing a decisive shift. Ukraine’s sophisticated use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles, sustained Western military and financial support, and Russia’s ability to offset its losses while continuing to benefit from energy revenues are reinforcing a balance in which neither side appears capable of achieving a breakthrough.
RUSSIAN ARMY VICTORY DAY COMMEMORATIONS ON RED SQUARE
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced a large-scale structural setback for the Kremlin across economic, military and geopolitical dimensions. Domestically, its war-driven economy is under increasing strain because of sustained military expenditure, inflation and structural imbalances. While the war is also making sustainability increasingly difficult for Ukraine, Kyiv has demonstrated growing capabilities in sustaining a war of attrition.
On the battlefield, Ukraine’s destruction of key logistical targets inside Russia is weakening the Kremlin’s ability to conduct the war. Meanwhile, Russia continues to suffer military casualties at an alarming rate despite achieving limited results. Although both sides receive assistance from external partners, their support systems differ significantly: Ukraine is backed by an integrated and technologically advanced coalition, whereas Russia relies on a more limited network based largely on commercial relationships.
Moreover, Russia’s broader support network is also coming under pressure. Recent developments in Iran and Venezuela indicate the weakening or strategic realignment of some of Moscow’s key partners. Compounding the situation for Russia is the Kremlin’s steady loss of geopolitical influence across many regions of the world.
These dynamics suggest that the passage of time is likely to place Russia, rather than Ukraine, at a greater disadvantage. In addition, increasing pressure on Russia’s “shadow fleet” and Ukraine’s attacks on key military logistics facilities and oil refineries have reduced valuable sources of revenue. Moscow’s global position has begun to erode both in areas where it has traditionally exercised influence—including the former Soviet states and, to some extent, Europe—and across many parts of the Global South.
Russia is currently experiencing an unprecedented fuel crisis, with fuel shortages reportedly prompting the introduction of gasoline rationing and efforts to increase imports. This has led to a sharp increase in petrol prices and long queues at filling stations. If the problem cannot be resolved quickly, the existing fuel shortage could spread to other sectors, disrupting everything from agriculture to transportation and causing broader deterioration in the supply of food and other essential daily necessities.
Repairing the damage to Russia’s highly vulnerable energy sector is likely to take considerable time. For example, according to information cited by Reuters from industry sources, the Moscow oil refinery struck by Ukrainian drones in June is not expected to resume operations until 2027. Repair efforts are likely to be further complicated by the need for spare parts that the Kremlin may have difficulty obtaining because of sanctions restrictions.
The region suffering the most severe impact is Crimea, which remains under Russian occupation. Ukraine’s campaign to isolate the peninsula has continued for months; access routes have increasingly come under the threat of drone operations, while energy infrastructure has been repeatedly targeted.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has stated that he is working to provide Ukraine with the air defence systems it “urgently needs,” following Russia’s continued missile attacks and after Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that Moscow intends to significantly increase its missile production ahead of the winter.
1. RUSSIA’S CHANGING TACTICAL APPROACH IN THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND PREPARATIONS FOR THE WINTER CAMPAIGN
Russia is seeking to intensify its campaign of coercion by targeting critical infrastructure and major political and economic centres such as Kyiv, with the aim of compelling negotiations that would advance the Kremlin’s interests. Russia has combined cyber operations, information warfare, intelligence activities, economic pressure, psychological operations and conventional military forces to shape the operational environment.
Non-military asymmetric measures constituted the initial and extended phase of the campaign, aimed at undermining infrastructure, public confidence and international narratives. However, Ukraine’s cyber resilience prevented systemic collapse. Disinformation and psychological operations targeted political and military leadership in an attempt to create uncertainty, but their effectiveness was limited by rapid fact-checking and strategic communications.
Although the battlefield remains important, this contest of deep-strike campaigns represents one of the principal lines of effort most likely to create conditions for a compromise over the next six months. Russia is employing a combination of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, glide bombs, one-way attack drones and first-person-view (FPV) drones to exert pressure on Ukraine across different sectors of the battlefield and in the rear areas.
Because these systems serve different operational purposes, glide bombs and artillery-intensive attacks are concentrated closer to the front line, whereas ballistic and cruise missiles are used to target higher-value infrastructure and military assets.
Meanwhile, Shahed-type one-way attack drones have enabled Russia to expand the scale, frequency and geographical reach of its strike campaign at a relatively low cost. Russia is using firepower strikes as an instrument of coercion to impose military, economic and psychological costs on the Ukrainian state and society, with the objective of persuading Kyiv and its supporters to accept an outcome more favourable to Moscow. This represents a classic strategy of coercion and punishment.
This also indicates a shift away from the policy of developing expensive unmanned aerial platforms that Ukraine had pursued up to 2022, toward a strategy centred on the development of low-cost kamikaze drones that can be rapidly manufactured, mass-produced and effectively deployed. This represents a broader transition from expensive, high-end systems toward low-cost mass production and attritional employment.
According to official Ukrainian sources, Russia carried out approximately 44,000 UAV attacks against Ukraine in 2025.
North Korea has increased its involvement in Russia’s war in Ukraine and has reportedly deployed missile units and more than 100 ballistic missiles to Russia. The addition of more North Korean missiles to Russia’s arsenal could enable Moscow to intensify ballistic missile attacks against Ukraine in the near future without having to draw further on its stocks of S-400 and Zircon missiles.
This figure differs by approximately 6,000 from reports indicating that Russia produced 38,000 UAVs in 2025, suggesting that official sources may not be disclosing the full and accurate figures. Both sides tend to underreport their own losses while significantly inflating those of their adversary.
To this end, Russia is employing massed salvo attacks consisting of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and one-way attack drones to strike targets behind the forward lines of the battlefield. These attacks are intended to degrade Ukraine’s ability to wage war, disrupt the systems sustaining the war effort, and increase pressure on Ukraine’s political leadership and population.
By examining the geography of this pressure campaign, it is possible to understand how Russia concentrates its strikes at the intersection of military operations, infrastructure, economic activity and civilian vulnerability; how it seeks to maximise the impact of its attacks; and how it is expanding the battlespace beyond the traditional front lines.
At the end of June, Russian President Vladimir Putin once again declared in an interview that Russia would win its war against Ukraine. He stated that the Russian military was advancing along an approximately 800-mile-long front line and occupying increasing amounts of Ukrainian territory with each passing day.
Russian Army Air Defence Systems Production Capacity
Russia has already intensified its heavy ballistic missile attacks against Ukrainian cities as its domestic missile production reaches peak levels. The Iskander-M, Zircon and Oniks missile strikes against Kyiv on 6–7 July, among the deadliest attacks of the year, killed more than 30 civilians.
Coming on the eve of the NATO summit in Ankara, these attacks appeared to serve not merely as a strike against Kyiv, but also as a signal aimed at demonstrating Russia’s resolve and reinforcing domestic control.
Russia has already intensified its heavy ballistic missile attacks against Ukrainian cities as its domestic missile production reaches peak levels. The Iskander-M, Zircon and Oniks missile strikes against Kyiv on 6–7 July, among the deadliest attacks of the year, killed more than 30 civilians. Occurring on the eve of the NATO summit in Ankara, these attacks were interpreted not merely as strikes against Kyiv, but also as a signal of internal control and resolve.
These attacks therefore do more than affect Ukrainian morale. They also reassure Russia’s military and security establishment that Putin retains the capability to retaliate, control the pace of escalation, and prevent pressure from Ukraine and the West from going unanswered.
Russian missile strikes were carried out ahead of the NATO Summit in Ankara, sending a clear message from Moscow that it intends to continue the war.
Every successful ballistic missile strike provides the Kremlin with a visible demonstration of strength at a time when it is becoming increasingly difficult to conceal its failures elsewhere. An analysis of Russia’s attacks reveals three principal trends.
First, while the scale of damage reported by Russia has increased over time, the geographical distribution of the damage has become increasingly concentrated in key target areas.
Second, many missile and UAV strikes are targeting logistical hubs that support Ukraine’s battlefield operations, particularly along the front line and in the southeastern regions, where strategic strikes increasingly overlap with a denser ecosystem of artillery, glide bombs, FPV drones and loitering munitions.
Third, as Russia seeks to increase the costs imposed on Ukraine’s economy, civilian population and political leadership, strategic industrial facilities, energy infrastructure, ports and major urban centres have become recurring targets.
Attacks on critical infrastructure weaken the physical systems that enable Ukraine to transport goods, repair damage, sustain industrial activity, export commodities and support military operations. Meanwhile, attacks on major cities and residential areas exert psychological pressure and signal that civilian life will remain vulnerable for as long as the war continues.
The Current Situation on the Front
In addition to the strategic value of individual targets, several factors help explain the geography of Russia’s pressure campaign in Ukraine. Proximity continues to shape Russia’s targeting patterns. Western regions are targeted less frequently, while most of the reported damage is concentrated in eastern and southeastern Ukraine.
Russia’s expanding missile production capacity, particularly the increase in Shahed-type UAV production, has enabled Moscow to increase the volume, depth and frequency of its attacks. Belarus’s operational role has also provided Russia with additional options for directing UAVs and complicating Ukraine’s air-defence efforts.
Seasonal timing is another important factor. Russia uses its winter campaigns to increase pressure on Ukraine’s electricity grid, heating systems and repair capacity during periods when civilian and industrial dependence on these systems is at its highest.
1. WHAT GAINS CAN UKRAINE ACHIEVE AT THE PEACE TABLE THROUGH ITS NEW MISSILE STRIKES?
Zelensky has indicated that Ukraine will seek to generate sufficient diplomatic, economic and military pressure on Moscow to force Russia to end the war before the onset of winter.
Ukraine is focusing on maximising its UAV production capacity and integrating it with artificial intelligence, low-cost, high-impact deep-strike capabilities, cyber warfare and electronic warfare, designed to place Russia’s oil and gas sector—and consequently its broader economy—at risk.
The population under the control of the Ukrainian government had fallen to approximately 25 million by 2026, compared with around 52 million in 1991, creating an increasingly difficult demographic shortfall in military-age manpower and eroding the domestic tax base required to sustain the war effort.
With U.S. military assistance largely withdrawn during the second Trump administration, European states—particularly Germany—are now shouldering approximately 90–95% of the financial and military support, placing an unsustainable financial and political burden on European governments that are already under domestic economic pressure.
Ukraine’s long-range UAV and balloon attacks impose tactical costs on Russian infrastructure, but they do not reverse territorial losses or compensate for structural deficiencies. According to some experts, the war may be approaching its ultimate objective of a managed settlement by late 2026, driven by European fatigue rather than battlefield advances.
In response to growing conventional deficiencies and manpower shortages, Ukraine has increasingly turned to asymmetric strategies, particularly long-range strike capabilities using unmanned systems. In late 2025 and throughout 2026, Ukrainian forces conducted drone strikes penetrating as far as 2,500 kilometres into Russian territory.
These operations achieved significant tactical successes by targeting Russian strategic aviation assets at airfields in the north and west, disrupting oil refineries and storage infrastructure, and exposing weaknesses in Russia’s air-defence coverage.
As can be seen, over the past two years Ukraine has developed an effective, though not necessarily entirely new, strategy of attrition: killing more Russian soldiers, at a faster rate. Ukrainian leaders have sought to maximise both Russian casualties and the economic costs imposed on Moscow.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukraine is a “key piece” in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to restore his influence over the former Soviet states.
Speaking at a meeting of Ukrainian ambassadors, Zelenskyy said that Putin’s objective was “to put back together what has already been dismantled.” He added: “The stronger and more independent the former Soviet states are, the more difficult his task will be. Ukraine is a key piece of this puzzle.”
Zelenskyy said that Putin wants to “dismantle” Ukraine, because defeating Kyiv would make it easier for Moscow to “deal with the other countries in the post-Soviet space.”
Meanwhile, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has, since April, emphasised the importance of ensuring that the country’s energy and infrastructure facilities are fully operational and reliably protected for the next heating season.
These remarks come at a time when Ukraine’s increasingly advanced UAV capabilities are aimed at raising the cost of the war for Russia and testing President Vladimir Putin’s resolve after four and a half years of conflict.
Russian forces have increased the number of missile strikes against Ukrainian cities in recent weeks, a development widely seen as part of an effort to exploit Kyiv’s shortfall in ballistic-missile defence capabilities.
Russian firefighting helicopter responds following Ukrainian missile strikes on St. Petersburg
Ukraine’s escalating UAV attacks, stretching from Crimea to St. Petersburg, have made international headlines, leading many commentators to argue that the trajectory of the war is turning in Kyiv’s favour. However, while these attacks are undoubtedly affecting the broader dynamics of the conflict, there are few indications that Russian President Vladimir Putin is any closer to ending his invasion. On the contrary, he appears more determined than ever to continue fighting.
With neither side having achieved a meaningful battlefield breakthrough so far this year, the most significant development of 2026 has been the dramatic expansion of Ukraine’s drone warfare capabilities. Ukrainian strategy has focused on two principal areas: long-range strikes reaching deep into Russian territory and medium-range attacks targeting Russian logistics behind the forward lines of the invasion.
ATTACKS ON WILDBERRIES ARE PUTTING PRESSURE ON RUSSIA’S LOGISTICS AND FINANCIAL NETWORK
The UAV attacks launched by Ukraine on 18 July and subsequently expanded to different regions have caused disruptions to the logistics network of Wildberries, Russia’s largest e-commerce platform.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has claimed that it carried out at least 100 successful attacks against Russia during an initial 40-day campaign targeting a broad range of objectives. These attacks were intended to generate multiple, distinct and at times mutually reinforcing effects aimed at increasing the cost to Russian President Vladimir Putin of continuing the war against Ukraine.
In a statement issued on 4 August, the SBU announced that its UAV operators had carried out more than 100 strikes against strategic Russian targets since the operation began on 26 June. These targets included defence-industrial base (DIB) facilities, air bases, air-defence assets, command centres, warships, tankers, oil refineries, and transportation and military logistics infrastructure.
The SBU emphasised that its operators had struck the occupied Saky, Hvardiiske, Belbek and Baherove air bases in Crimea, as well as the Yevpatoria Aircraft Plant; Engels Air Base in Saratov Oblast; and Khanskaya Air Base in the Republic of Adygea. It further claimed that the strikes destroyed one Tu-95MS strategic bomber, two Su-35 fighter aircraft and two L-39 advanced trainer aircraft, while also striking 14 Russian oil refineries and other oil infrastructure facilities, two cargo vessels and two “shadow fleet” oil tankers.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated on 4 August that he had approved another SBU operation, although he did not disclose its duration, nature or targets.
The argument that Ukraine’s recent progress represents a rare window of opportunity to increase pressure on Putin and create conditions for a negotiated end to Europe’s largest war since the Second World War remains debatable. Indeed, this opportunity is likely to be temporary.
For this reason, it has been argued that Kyiv’s European partners should demonstrate their ability to act decisively on the international stage by increasing their support for Ukraine.
People queue at a petrol station in Moscow on 10 July 2026.
For much of the war, both the Russian elite and the wider population were still able to view the conflict as a distant and profitable undertaking, shielded by an economy that remained a major oil exporter. Since the beginning of 2026, Ukrainian long-range UAVs have struck Russian oil refineries approximately 200 times, disabling eight of the country’s ten largest facilities, including the refinery in Omsk, located more than 2,500 kilometres from the Ukrainian border.
The result is an unprecedented fuel crisis for one of the world’s three largest oil producers: more than 90% of Russia’s regions are now subject to petrol and diesel rationing, while domestic gasoline production is running approximately one-fifth below demand. The pressure has become so severe that even Putin has publicly acknowledged the reality of the shortages.
As Ukraine has intensified its UAV attacks against refineries, tankers and other energy infrastructure, Russian refinery output fell in July to its lowest level in more than two decades. According to figures reported by Bloomberg based on EA Analytics data, Russian refineries processed an estimated 3.6 million barrels of crude oil per day last month—the lowest level since May 2002. This figure is approximately one-third below the seasonal norm. Between 2020 and 2025, Russian refineries processed an average of between 5.3 million and 5.6 million barrels of oil per day during the same period of the year.
Russian refineries have suffered losses in production and distribution capacity following missile strikes.
By targeting Russian refineries and triggering one of the country’s worst fuel crises in decades, Ukraine has struck at the implicit social contract between the Russian population and Vladimir Putin: stability and prosperity in exchange for limited freedoms.
The reach of Ukrainian attacks into Moscow, St. Petersburg and even Siberia—places where Russians are seeing the war from their windows for the first time in their lives—has created uncertainty about the regime’s ability to protect the population’s basic needs.
Ukraine’s deep strikes against Russian territory targeting refinery capacity, combined with medium-range attacks on distribution nodes such as oil tankers, storage facilities and transportation corridors, have further exacerbated Russia’s fuel crisis.
In occupied Crimea, Russian authorities declared a state of emergency in late June, and gasoline was rationed to 20 litres per vehicle per week; prepaid fuel vouchers reportedly sold out within minutes of being made available.
Although the fuel crisis appears to be negatively correlated with Russian public support for the war, it does not show a direct correlation with support for Russian President Vladimir Putin. This suggests that a political crisis remains highly unlikely in the near term.
Ukraine’s Attacks on Wildberries
A significant change in the current state of the war may still be some distance away. In the meantime, Ukraine will need to continue capitalising on the momentum of its strikes to make meaningful progress in the war effort, while its partners will need to remain patient and continue supporting Kyiv as it does so.
Previous Ukrainian attacks had largely focused on military and energy targets. However, these latest strikes have targeted a highly successful enterprise with a nationwide logistics network that accounts for more than 50% of total exports, as well as a significant share of online retail orders in Russia.
Many businesses have reportedly suffered serious losses since Wildberries facilities began experiencing disruptions. Over the past four and a half years, Russian businesses have faced countless disruptions as a result of the war in Ukraine. Western sanctions have fragmented supply chains. Tax increases have squeezed profit margins. Internet outages have disrupted operations. More recently, fuel shortages have increased costs while intensifying inflationary pressures.
Regardless of their military significance, these attacks are bringing the war closer to the Russian population. Similar to the recent attacks on oil refineries, the strikes on Wildberries have generated enormous clouds of smoke visible from many kilometres away. In some cases, it reportedly took days to extinguish the fires.
Since mid-July, Ukraine has attacked approximately two dozen Wildberries logistics centres and has accused the company of supplying the Russian military with UAV components and other equipment.
1. HOW CLOSE ARE THE PARTIES TO PEACE NEGOTIATIONS?
Russian President Vladimir Putin has stated that he believes the Russia–Ukraine war—the deadliest conflict in Europe since the Second World War—is approaching its end, saying: “I think the matter is coming to an end.”
Putin has stated that he would meet Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy only once a lasting peace agreement had been secured. He said: “A meeting in a third country is also possible, but for a long-term historical perspective, the final agreements must first be secured before participating in such an event and signing [the treaty]. However, this should be the final step.”
What does Vladimir Putin’s suggestion that Russia’s war with Ukraine may be “coming to an end” actually mean?
The Russian president has accused the West of prolonging the conflict by providing military support to Kyiv. In his remarks, Putin argued:
“What exactly is the West? I think it is the so-called globalist part of the Western elites. They are the ones fighting against us by proxy through Ukraine. Of course, they are doing quite well in this regard because they were the ones who triggered this conflict. In the early 1990s, they began lying to us about NATO not expanding eastward.”
President Putin Criticises Europe, Blaming It for Prolonging the War in Ukraine
As 2026 began, the United States, Russia and Ukraine held their first official contacts in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, marking the beginning of a new phase in the negotiations.
On 17–18 February 2026, a new round of trilateral talks involving Russia, the United States and Ukraine was held in Geneva, Switzerland. As is known, the U.S.-mediated ceasefire negotiations between Russia and Ukraine conducted in March were suspended amid escalating tensions in the Middle East, which diverted international attention from Europe’s largest conflict since the Second World War.
The two leaders last met in Alaska in August 2025 in an effort to find a solution to the war between Ukraine and Russia.
With the war in Iran continuing, peace negotiations have largely been put on hold.
Both Russia and Ukraine have recently intensified attacks targeting major cities, energy facilities and storage depots, as the extensive front line has remained largely static and U.S.-led mediation efforts have failed to achieve meaningful progress toward ending the war.
Putin’s uncompromising position should come as no surprise. Although Ukraine’s expanding UAV campaign has inflicted significant damage, it has not yet delivered a decisive blow. At present, Russia retains an overall military advantage in terms of manpower and firepower. Despite suffering heavy casualties, Putin’s invasion force continues to advance in Ukraine, albeit at an extremely slow pace.
Russia has insisted on gaining control of the entire Donbas region and has demanded international recognition of the incorporation of Crimea and the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions into the Russian Federation.Moscow has stated that a long-term agreement should not be expected until the territorial question has been resolved.
Ukraine, by contrast, has insisted that negotiations begin on the basis of the current line of contact between the two armies and continues to reject any unilateral withdrawal from the parts of Donbas that remain under Ukrainian control.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has emphasised that territorial issues cannot be resolved through the ongoing technical negotiations and require direct engagement at the level of national leaders.
Ukraine has also identified Western participation and the provision of legally binding security guarantees as fundamental conditions for a ceasefire.
According to the draft “20-Point Peace Plan” proposed at the end of 2025, Ukraine sought to maintain an armed force of 800,000 personnel and demanded a written commitment from Russia to “refrain from aggression against Europe and Ukraine.”
Russia has firmly opposed the deployment of Western military personnel, facilities and weapons in Ukraine. Moscow has demanded that Ukraine remain neutral, commit not to join military alliances such as NATO, and terminate all existing treaties and arrangements relating to NATO.
MUTUAL ATTACKS BY THE PARTIES
However, when examining the situation on the ground, Russia’s war against Ukraine appears to be entering a new phase. This does not mean that the situation will change overnight, but the likelihood of escalation and the widening of the conflict is increasing.
The most important new development has been the change in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s domestic political position. Hopes that Putin might make concessions in the face of mounting problems have proven misplaced. Instead, the situation increasingly resembles a bolt that has become tightly jammed: applying more force will not make the mechanism work; it will only increase the strain on the surrounding structure. In other words, domestic pressures are unlikely to change Putin’s mind; they will merely increase the likelihood of cracks emerging throughout the system.
As a result, there are currently two distinct trends within Russia that could potentially destabilise the regime.
The first is Putin’s vision of the war. Under this approach, escalation generates further escalation, the security services expand their areas of responsibility, the government adapts to wartime requirements, and dwindling resources are increasingly channelled toward the war effort. This requires the regime to move toward radicalisation, harsher demands and a willingness to expand the geographical scope of the conflict.
The second is a growing demand for change: a more realistic assessment of Russia’s geopolitical capabilities, more competent domestic decision-making mechanisms, and more achievable war objectives. It is difficult to predict exactly how this demand will develop, but there are indications that it is shared even by some pro-Kremlin actors. This is a dangerous sentiment for the regime because it is neither explicitly anti-war nor explicitly anti-Putin.
Without significant momentum toward serious peace negotiations, these two trends are likely to become increasingly antagonistic.
Foreign Affairs — “The Next Russia” by Michael Kofman
Critical Threats Project — Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, 5 August 2026
Only a few months ago, the situation appeared different. Ukraine had significantly intensified its attacks deep inside Russia. With Russian forces failing to achieve major gains on the front and discontent reportedly increasing within Russia, there were hopes that Vladimir Putin might eventually come to the negotiating table.
Instead, Ukraine’s intensified attacks have had the opposite effect on the Kremlin: Russia has become even more determined to achieve its objectives regardless of the cost. Moscow is now preparing for another brutal winter for the Ukrainian population and appears to hope that sustained pressure will eventually break the home front.
Some experts argue that both Ukraine and Russia “want the United States to re-engage” and that Trump has “an opportune moment to make peace, but risks losing it.” Graham of the Council on Foreign Relations has stated that the war is caught in a “dangerous spiral of escalation,” while both sides, being under considerable strain, are nevertheless “ready for a settlement.”
Some Russian analysts, however, argue that Russia still “has the capacity to sustain the conflict.” They contend that its economy remains “sufficiently functional” and that Russia possesses the manpower and weapons necessary to continue fighting.
According to these analysts, Putin believes that Russia can maintain its strategic advantage through the destructive power of its ballistic missiles and an increasingly quiet mobilisation effort that is expected to emerge in the near future. As long as Putin retains these convictions, they argue, he will have little incentive to negotiate and will instead seek to “wear Ukraine down.”
As noted earlier, from the first months of the conflict in 2022, the Kremlin framed the war around the “demilitarisation” and “denazification” of Ukraine. Russia’s principal negotiating demands have included Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions; abandonment of its NATO membership aspirations; acceptance of neutrality; and various other far-reaching political concessions.
Put in coercive terms, Russia’s theory of victory is to weaken Ukraine militarily, pressure it economically, constrain it politically and isolate it diplomatically, thereby compelling Kyiv and its supporters to accept an agreement that limits Ukraine’s sovereignty, military capabilities, territorial control and alliance with the West.
Putin has acknowledged that Ukrainian UAV attacks targeting Russian oil refineries and other critical infrastructure deep behind the Ukrainian front lines are “causing problems.” However, he insisted that Russia would adapt and continue with determination. “These terrorist attacks have no impact on the situation,” he stated.
CONCLUSION AND OVERALL OUTLOOK
In a prolonged armed conflict, victory is rarely determined by initial operational brilliance. Instead, it is determined by the balance of structural resilience across three principal determinants of war-making capacity: demographic strength, financial and industrial power, and external patronage.
The demographic base determines the available active labour pool, manpower retention and socio-political cohesion. Financial and industrial power determines defence-production capacity, fiscal solvency and energy security. External patronage provides essential material and financial assistance, political alignment and operational support.
Wars generally end when one or both belligerents experience structural exhaustion of their capacity to wage war.
The failure to achieve rapid victories in Ukraine and Iran has trapped both Russia and the United States in costly conflicts, damaged their reputations as military powers and weakened domestic and international perceptions of the leadership of Putin and Trump. Declining U.S. leadership and strained alliances have forced Europe, Ukraine and other actors to adapt to a less predictable great-power order.
The conflict is likely to remain primarily a war of attrition. Neither Russia nor Ukraine appears to be in a position to achieve a decisive military breakthrough in 2026.
Tactical innovations—including Ukraine’s expanding use of UAVs and unmanned systems—will continue to shape battlefield conditions, but they are unlikely, by themselves, to alter the overall trajectory of the war.
External support will remain vital to Ukraine’s ability to sustain the war effort. However, uncertainty surrounding the United States and uneven European unity will limit the predictability of future assistance.
Russian strikes are targeting logistics, stockpiles, headquarters and the military-industrial base, while coordination is increasingly under strain. Forced mobilisation has damaged military morale and reduced the willingness of some forces to fight and die for what they perceive as Western interests. With the West increasingly prioritising the Middle East, Ukraine risks being left with largely symbolic quantities of drones and low-cost weapons.
Russia may retain certain advantages, but the geopolitical consequences of the war for Moscow remain mixed. The current oil crisis has simultaneously exposed vulnerabilities in Russia’s energy economy while continuing to generate substantial revenues for the state treasury and the financing of the war effort. Russia’s energy revenues and its ability to adapt on the battlefield may help Moscow compensate for continuing losses, even as Ukrainian attacks constrain parts of its export infrastructure.
A New Mobilisation in Russia
If the Kremlin proceeds with a new mobilisation after the September elections, Putin is reportedly considering mobilising another 500,000 troops by the autumn, with the recruitment process likely to extend over several months. In our assessment, as argued throughout this article, this strengthens the assumption that the war will be prolonged unless an unexpected development fundamentally changes the strategic environment.
Indeed, Putin faces a fundamental strategic dilemma: either he must deliver a major military success, or he must find a way to return home without appearing to have lost. Returning home without a significant achievement would potentially threaten the stability of his regime. Consequently, securing a major breakthrough in Ukraine may appear to be his only viable option. All indications suggest that, regardless of the cost, Moscow intends to pursue such an objective this winter.
The Kremlin’s military and political elite may perceive a new strategic opportunity arising from Ukraine’s growing shortage of Patriot interceptors and Europe’s hesitation over establishing a no-fly zone.
North Korea has reportedly begun deploying a missile unit to western Russia and could equip it with 120 ballistic missiles and six launchers for attacks against Ukraine.
The Air War Will Intensify
The air war is likely to intensify. As Ukraine increases its attacks against Russia’s military-industrial economy, Moscow is expected to rely increasingly on ballistic missiles, jet-powered Shahed UAVs and attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure.
Prospects for Peace
Previous compromise formulas have failed, and Putin appears unwilling to stop without an outcome that he can present as a victory. New ideas are therefore being sought.
Even under Putin, a ceasefire would probably not bring an end to Russian revisionism; rather, it would merely “shift it to a different level.”
Peace negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have made no meaningful progress on fundamental issues such as territorial division and security guarantees, and no comprehensive peace agreement has been reached. The Russia–Ukraine peace process has therefore entered a “critical phase” and a decisive period.
Possible U.S. Strategic Options Under Trump
Under the Trump strategy, the United States could continue the 2025 Alaska approach, maintaining indirect assistance while remaining at a serious crossroads with its European allies over the future course of the war.
A second and more difficult option would be direct U.S. military intervention, which could carry the grave risk of escalating the conflict into a NATO–Russia confrontation with a potential nuclear dimension.
A third option would be to bring the parties together in Istanbul, under Türkiye’s auspices, for an honourable and legally grounded ceasefire and peace negotiations, providing a framework for compromise and a sustainable political settlement.
In this context, Türkiye’s diplomatic role could once again become strategically significant: Istanbul could provide a neutral and practical platform where the parties can move from military coercion toward a negotiated settlement without either side being forced to accept an unconditional surrender.